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black migration to the North, which made the Democratic Party more northern and liberal, and the population growth and migrants that augmented Republican
ranks throughout the Sunbelt. He also examines the evangelical reaction and the secular response, noting that the
“contemporary relationship between church-going habits
and presidential vote actually emerged quite suddenly
between the 1988 and 1992 elections” (p. 115). In addition, both books characterize contemporary electoral campaigns as primarily about mobilizing core constituencies,
rather than appealing to swing voters. They both conclude that gerrymandering played little role in congressional polarization. Both are skeptical about any easy
reforms that would reverse these trends. And both reflect
back on the famous 1951 American Political Science Association report “Toward a More Responsible Two-Party
System” by warning political scientists to “be careful what
you wish for, lest it come true” (Abramowitz pp. ix–x;
see also Fiorina pp. xv–xvii, 159–160).
With both books drawing on many of the same data
sources, it is clear that the principal differences between
them are interpretive. But the disagreements are not merely
semantic or superficial. Together they provide a productive debate about contemporary political representation
in the United States. Each is provocative, engaging, easy
to read, perfectly appropriate for use in undergraduate
courses, and capable of reaching an audience beyond political science.
Still, in reading two such books that take for granted
an extraordinary intensity of elite polarization in American politics, I wonder if the use of roll-call votes to measure congressional polarization has led to an exaggerated
view. Looking instead to the policies pursued by the two
parties when they are in power suggests more centrism
than extremism. Even during the years of unified Republican control under President George W. Bush, legislation on hot-button issues generally hewed close to
mainstream opinion—for example, limiting federal recognition of gay marriage but not interfering with state
policies to the contrary, and banning only some lateterm abortion procedures. When the Democrats subsequently came back to power, with supermajority control
of the Senate after 2008, they did not roll back the Republican policies that they had so vigorously opposed. The
2003 Medicare prescription drug benefit, created to great
outcry among Democrats, was only marginally tweaked
during the landmark health care reform of 2010. President Bush’s highly contentious antiterrorism domestic surveillance programs were retroactively validated by a
Democratic-controlled Congress in 2007. At this writing, a Democratic Congress is likely to extend the controversial 2001 Bush tax cuts for all but the highest income
taxpayers (and it is possible that even those may be preserved). President Bush’s auto and banking bailouts were
continued under Obama.

Such continuities suggest that a considerable share of
the polarization in Washington voting and rhetoric may
be engineered for political communication and voter mobilization. During an era of remarkably tight two-party
competition, the party out of power continually impeaches
the performance of the party in power in a bid for
increased public support. But in the end, the two parties
may not disagree nearly so profoundly as they seem to
now.
From Words to Worlds: Exploring Constitutional
Functionality. By Beau Breslin. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2008. 232p. $50.00.
doi:10.1017/S153759271000263X

— Robert L. Tsai, American University

With this concise and lively treatment of constitutions
and their functions, Beau Breslin aims to restore the role
of text to the study of democratic constitutionalism. Marginalized by scholarly attention to the actions and interpretations of particular legal actors, he says, the U.S.
Constitution as a “unique composition” serving “symbolic
and practical” purposes has all too often been overlooked
(pp. 3, 5). As a corrective, Breslin trains attention on seven
functions served by a written constitution: transforming
existing orders, conveying collective aspirations, designing institutions, mediating conflict, recognizing claims of
subnational communities, empowering social actors, and
constraining governmental authority. Each chapter is
devoted to explicating a different function. Throughout,
the author employs useful examples from around the world,
with Canada, Iraq, Israel, South Africa, and the United
States receiving the most attention.
Breslin’s approach makes for a learned, accessible introduction to the reasons why people worldwide might turn
to written constitutionalism, even if it is not always conducive to fine-grained scrutiny of any particular people’s
constitution-writing experience. The author is at his best
when he moves beyond the various attributes of constitutions in the abstract and comments on global trends. In
these places, he flirts with the empirical questions of constitutionalism over time: namely, how the practice has
changed, what appears to have been learned from others’
experiments, and what these lessons bode for the future of
constitutionalism. He observes that constitutions have gotten longer (p. 55), and that the typical preamble, such as
that of the South African Constitution, now painstakingly records a country’s tragic past to be overcome instead
of remaining content with universal statements on liberty
and justice (p. 57). As constitutions have become more
codelike, they have also devoted more space to articulating individual liberties, often in advance of establishing
the structure of government (pp. 84–85).
Breslin’s account stimulates several questions: Are these
trends, accelerated by the processes of antitotalitarianism
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and decolonization, indicative of efficient writing practices or rote copying? How many are bottom-up constitutions and which are top-down charters? Could we say,
with any assurance, that the ascendance of written constitutionalism has produced greater freedoms as well—or is
this presumed cause-and-effect relationship between writing and liberty more imagined than proven?
Among the constitutional functions explored by Breslin, two seem particularly salient in the post-Cold War
age: managing social conflict and preserving cultural heritage. Social movements worldwide have unleashed not
only tales of historical oppression but also urgent pleas for
legal accommodation. Breslin presents Canada as a successful episode of writing to manage conflict and recognize cultural minorities (pp. 106–110, 121–132). He
marshals polls suggesting that Canadians’ participation in
the 1982 revision of their constitution unified them around
a vision of pluralist democracy (pp. 108–109). Assuming
this to be true, is it a replicable experience, or is there
something about Canadian society or its traditions that
made this outcome uniquely plausible?
Another of Breslin’s claims worth unpacking is the
impact of international opinion favoring written constitutionalism. Just as acquiring nuclear weapons once signified international stature and influence, having a
constitution to call one’s own secures a people a place
among the community of modern nations. It must be a
powerful temptation, then, to author a constitution in
order to maximize aspirational and expressive gains, even
when the gulf between text and enforcement is likely to
be significant. Along with the advent of global constitutionalism, one might expect a corresponding rise in vastly
underenforced and incompletely authorized constitutions. It is an empirical matter to discover the extent to
which intended functions actually are fulfilled, or whether,
instead, constitutional provisions are either ignored or
work at cross-purposes.
As Breslin notes (p. 98–99), the international expectation to have a constitution of one’s own is bucked by
Israel, whose citizens made plans to write a unitary constitution in 1948 but have never completed the task.
Two reasons are frequently cited: fears that a constitution
would, first, dilute the nation’s religious distinctiveness
and, second, hamstring efforts to deal with matters of
national security. Perhaps with Canada in mind, the author
observes that authoring a Bill of Rights might “have the
effect of reaching out to minority religious and ethnic
groups who have long felt oppressed by government policies” (p. 100). Likewise, transparent ordering of state
institutions “might go a long way toward appeasing communities that believe the largely unconstrained authority
of the state has contributed to ongoing violence” (p. 100).
At this point, a thicker case study of Israel, like Breslin’s
extensive treatment of Canada, might prove illuminating. What factors have enabled Israel to be perceived as a

modern constitutional democracy while simultaneously
avoiding the harshest condemnation for refusing to codify legal limits with clarity? Has the staunch support
of Western allies promoted or stunted Israel’s legal
development?
To the extent that internal practices have allowed Israel
to walk a fine line, the relatively brisk maturity of Israel’s
legal culture may have something to do with it. The Israeli
Supreme Court’s declaration of a “constitutional revolution” elevating the Basic Law to supreme normative status
suggests that juridic constitutionalism has filled the void
to repair any reputational damage caused by piecemeal
constitutionalism. Although the 1992 Basic Laws mention only a slice of rights found in liberal nations, Aharon
Barak led the Israeli Supreme Court through a creative
synthesis of disparate legal texts, deeming speech and
equality—two rights not mentioned in the Basic Law—to
be nevertheless part of Israeli constitutional law’s protection of “dignity.” Still, to what extent can judge-driven
constitutionalism provide features found wanting in original design?
This leads to a deeper question: the circumstances under
which underwritten or disaggregated constitutional systems succeed or fail. The inquiry may be understood as a
natural outgrowth of Breslin’s project, for eventually one
will want to know what metrics ought to be used to assess
the actual functionality of design choices. Theorists assume
a necessary organic connection between a citizenry and its
constitution for certain functions (e.g., aspirational,
identity-making) to be realized. Is it consent, authenticity,
inclusiveness, or procedural fairness that ought to be the
benchmark for this connection? Although he offers Joseph
Raz’s perspective that the moral legitimacy of a constitution derives from the justifications of original authors but
can change as time passes, Breslin himself does not take a
firm position as to how a constitution maintains legitimacy over time. Perhaps—consistent with a functional
account—certain core functions must be well served before
a constitution is declared legitimate in the eyes of the
living?
Breslin’s later discussion of England’s unwritten constitutional tradition suggests that a robust legal culture is
essential to a polity that stands the test of time. Once
developed, such a culture inculcates respect for rules and
controversial outcomes, fosters lawyers and activists capable of testing written commitments, and enables jurists to
envision plausible routes when democratic majorities show
little patience for the enforcement of legal limits. The text
of a constitution may begin the task of creating such an
ethos and legalized way of life—by rhetorically empowering committed citizens and talented judges and establishing rule-of-law mechanisms with a shot at growing strong
and uncorrupted. But much of these social conditions
upon which success depends lie far beyond the text of a
constitution. They have to do with text, but after the
December 2010 | Vol. 8/No. 4 1229
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moment of inscription they have more to do with how
others make use of the text.
Breslin’s erudite book elucidates the reasons a people
might engage in constitutional creation in the first place—
the point at which dreams are the most glorious and words
are the most inspirational. What follows can never match
a people’s sheer audacity in that moment, but with Breslin’s helpful prompting, it may one day be possible to test
their leap of faith.
Democracy in the States: Experiments in Election
Reform. Edited by Bruce E. Cain, Todd Donovan, and Caroline J.
Tolbert. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008. 256p.
$62.95 paper, $26.95 cloth.
The Way We Vote: The Local Dimension of American
Suffrage. By Alec C. Ewald. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press,
2009. 256p. $69.95 cloth, $29.95 paper.
Discount Voting: Voter Registration Reforms and
Their Effects. By Michael J. Hanmer. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2009. 264p. $79.00.
doi:10.1017/S1537592710002641

— Edward M. Burmila, University of Georgia
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Aldous Huxley commented that consistency “is contrary
to nature, contrary to life. The only completely consistent
people are dead.” If so, then the American electoral system, with its local diversity in rules, practices, and political culture, is a living, breathing, and evolving entity. One
of the distinguishing characteristics of American elections
compared to other advanced democracies is the absence of
uniform, “nationalized” elections. Instead, voting and
counting ballots are fundamentally local activities. While
localism is a boon for political scientists, given the opportunities for natural experiments it creates, allowing local
interpretations of such a basic democratic right has been
problematic historically. To what extent are local differences in procedures and practices permissible if they have
a demonstrable impact on individuals’ ability or propensity to participate in elections? This question underlies
debates over election reform in the United States, and
these reforms in turn motivate and inform the three works
reviewed here.
In The Way We Vote, Alec Ewald, the author of prominent research on voter registration and felony disenfranchisement, provides a thorough account of the origins
and history of the American tradition of decentralized
control of elections. The vagaries inherent in this highly
localized system of administration are often fodder for
critics, but Ewald takes a different approach, acknowledging the variation in the system while arguing that localism
is both intentional and beneficial. His major theoretical
contribution stems from the argument that the right to
vote is fundamentally a “practice” (p. 9) conditioned by
local institutions that administer elections. While the right

to vote is derived from the law, the local institutions that
execute the law and administer the actual process of voting are equally important components of suffrage in practice. Those local institutions vary in the United States to a
degree unique among democracies.
The bulk of Ewald’s book is devoted to a detailed account
of the origin, history, and evolution of shared local, state,
and national control of elections in the United States.
This is the strength of the book, making it of particular
interest to scholars of American political development.
The history of American suffrage shows that control of
the electoral process is decentralized by design. It reflects
both the American interpretation of democratic ideals and
practical considerations. Reaching back to colonial times,
Ewald explains how elections evolved from operations
purely under local control to the complex mix of congressional mandates, court rulings, state laws, and local practices that exists today. While recognizing the value of the
element of centralized control—the Voting Rights Act,
for example, was inarguably beneficial by ensuring the
consistent application of rights—he argues that local practices are an essential component of self-rule and popular
sovereignty.
This segues into Ewald’s core account of the four benefits of localism: increased efficacy and ownership of the
political process, the potential for innovation and experimentation, the diffusion of power as a bulwark against the
centralized authority, and increased participation driven
by social approbation when local institutions are instrumental to the electoral process. Ultimately, Ewald makes a
valuable distinction between standardization and uniformity as goals of election reform. He argues that reforms
are best focused on standardizing elections—ensuring transparency, accuracy, fairness, participation, and equal access.
But reforms neither can nor should seek to enforce uniformity, defined as ensuring that all voters across the country have identical experiences on Election Day. In other
words, variable aspects of elections, such as the method of
voting, polling hours, and provision of alternative voting
methods, should remain under local control to maximize
the benefits of localism.
While The Way We Vote is primarily historical in its
analysis, Discount Voting offers the cutting edge of mixedmethods research on the relationship between voter turnout and electoral rules. Michael Hanmer, whose work has
established him as a rising name in research on turnout
and voting technology, tackles a question that has plagued
scholars of American turnout for the past three decades.
If, as the existing literature argues, registration is a costly
barrier to voting, why have structural reforms that facilitate registration done so little to improve turnout? He
focuses on two reforms—Election Day registration (EDR)
and both state and federal “motor voter” laws that combine driver services, such as renewing a license, with voter
registration.
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